Michigan Sex Crime Attorneys Blog
Karl Butler was charged in Kalamazoo County with five counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct and one count of home invasion over a 2009 incident. He admitted the sexual contact and said it was consensual. His defense turned on evidence that the complainant had accused two other men of sexual assault in 2008, and that the accusation was false: the defense had statements from the two men and police reports on the earlier investigation.
The pretrial fight over that evidence consumed years. The trial court first denied the motion to admit it. On a renewed motion, the court changed course and ruled that the testimony could come in, but it never first held the closed evidentiary hearing Michigan law requires. The Court of Appeals reversed and held the evidence should be excluded. In March 2024, the Michigan Supreme Court, in a unanimous decision, vacated that decision too. Both lower courts had skipped the required step: once the defense produced some apparently credible and potentially admissible evidence that the earlier allegation was false, the trial court had to hold an in camera evidentiary hearing before deciding anything about admissibility.
People v. Butler is one recent answer to a question that runs through nearly every Michigan criminal sexual conduct prosecution: when does the exclusion of defense evidence cross the line from ordinary evidence law into a violation of the constitutional right to present a defense? The Michigan Supreme Court has confronted that question twice in two years, in Butler and in the 2025 rape-shield decision People v. Masi, and the Court of Appeals added a published decision on records discovery, People v. Leonard, in June 2026.
The Constitutional Baseline
A criminal defendant’s right to confront accusers and present a defense comes from the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments and from Article 1, ยง 20 of the Michigan Constitution. The United States Supreme Court has enforced it from Chambers v. Mississippi in 1973 through Crane v. Kentucky in 1986 and Holmes v. South Carolina in 2006.
The right is not unlimited. A defendant must still comply with the rules of evidence and procedure. Holmes states the constitutional test: an evidence rule violates the right to present a defense when it is arbitrary or disproportionate to the purpose it is designed to serve. How that test plays out depends on which barrier the defense evidence has run into.
Rape-Shield Evidence and the Hackett Safety Valve
Michigan’s rape-shield statute, MCL 750.520j, bars evidence of a complainant’s sexual conduct. Its two written exceptions, prior sexual conduct with the defendant and evidence explaining the source of semen, pregnancy, or disease, are themselves conditional: the judge must find the evidence material and that its inflammatory or prejudicial nature does not outweigh its probative value. Evidence offered under either exception requires a written motion and offer of proof within 10 days after arraignment on the information, with a narrower statutory mechanism for information that first surfaces at trial. That deadline belongs to the statute. A claim that the Constitution itself requires admission is analyzed on its own terms, though counsel who sits on such a claim invites trouble anyway.
Since People v. Hackett in 1984, the Michigan Supreme Court has recognized that the statute must sometimes yield to constitutional rights, through a controlled procedure: an offer of proof, then an in camera hearing before the judge, never an open airing in front of the jury. Hackett identified bias, an ulterior motive, and prior false accusations as examples of what the Constitution may require a court to admit.
Sexual Knowledge from Another Source: Masi
People v. Masi, decided July 14, 2025, shows the safety valve at work in child CSC cases. A Macomb County defendant sought to introduce a 2010 police report documenting one complainant’s sexual abuse by another relative, to explain how a young child could describe sexual acts in detail without having learned them from him. The evidence had been excluded because the other relative was never convicted, a requirement the Court of Appeals had imposed since People v. Morse in 1998.
The Supreme Court held that prior abuse is “sexual conduct” under the rape-shield statute, so the defense cannot simply introduce it. But it overruled Morse’s conviction requirement and adopted a five-factor test, applied at an in camera evidentiary hearing: whether the prior act occurred, whether it closely resembled the charged conduct, whether it is relevant to a material issue, whether the evidence is necessary to the defense, and whether its probative value outweighs its prejudicial effect. Masi did not order the evidence admitted. It ordered the analysis the Constitution requires before exclusion.
Prior False Accusations: What Butler Requires
Butler supplies the procedure when the defense theory is that the complainant has falsely accused before. The threshold showing is modest but real: some apparently credible and potentially admissible evidence that the prior allegation was false. Once it is met, the in camera evidentiary hearing is mandatory. In Butler, the two men’s statements and the 2008 police reports were enough.
Two cautions come straight from the opinion. Falsity is the contested question, not a given; that charges were never filed against the men the complainant accused does not by itself prove the accusation was false, and the Supreme Court made no finding either way. And Butler left unresolved what standard of proof the defense must ultimately satisfy at the hearing, sending that question back to the lower courts. Lawyers litigating these motions today are arguing on partially unsettled ground, which makes the quality of the offer of proof even more important.
Prior inconsistent statements are a narrower tool. When a complainant’s account shifts between the forensic interview, the preliminary examination, and trial, cross-examination on the inconsistency is standard impeachment under MRE 613. The recurring fights are about mechanics: whether extrinsic evidence of the inconsistency is allowed, and whether the earlier statement can be used only to impeach or also as substantive evidence under the hearsay rules. Where the inconsistent statement itself involves sexual conduct or sits inside a privileged record, the barriers described elsewhere in this article stack on top.
Pointing to a Third Party
When the defense contends someone else committed the assault, ordinary relevance rules govern. Holmes v. South Carolina sets the constitutional floor: South Carolina had barred a defendant’s third-party guilt evidence because the prosecution’s forensic case looked strong, and a unanimous United States Supreme Court held that rule arbitrary, because the strength of the prosecution’s case says nothing about the relevance of the defense’s.
Holmes does not make third-party evidence automatically admissible. Courts remain free to exclude evidence that is speculative, remote, or not genuinely connected to the charged offense, and bare opportunity or motive frequently fails that test. The defense needs a concrete link: physical evidence, access at the relevant time, plus corroborating details, and an alternative explanation for the medical or DNA findings. Where the third-party theory involves sexual contact with the complainant, the rape-shield statute’s source-of-semen, pregnancy, or disease exception may govern, with its 10-day deadline, so careful defense teams often file the statutory motion and the constitutional motion together.
Privileged and Confidential Records
Counseling records, therapy notes, and CPS files raise a different problem: the defense usually cannot see them at all. Michigan struck a balance in People v. Stanaway in 1994, which is now codified in MCR 6.201(C)(2). The defense must show a good-faith belief, grounded in articulable fact, that there is a reasonable probability the records contain material information necessary to the defense. If the showing is made, the judge inspects the records in camera. This is a document inspection by the court, a different procedure from the testimonial hearings in Butler and Masi. Records the judge releases stay in counsel’s exclusive custody and can be used only for the approved purpose.
The showing is demanding, and it cuts both ways. In People v. Davis-Christian, the Court of Appeals held that generalized assertions amounting to a fishing expedition do not justify in camera review, and that a trial court errs by ordering review on less than that. In People v. Leonard, a published June 2026 decision, the Court of Appeals refused a defendant’s demand for complainants’ complete cell phone data, repeating that there is no general constitutional right to discovery and that the defense must articulate the specific evidence it expects to find and the fact it would prove. Leonard also underscores the rule’s remedy when a privilege is absolute, and its holder refuses inspection or disclosure: the court suppresses or strikes the privilege holder’s testimony. A privilege can hold, but not while its holder testifies against the accused.
How These Fights Are Won and Preserved
The procedures differ, but the common denominator is specificity. Judges order in camera hearings and record inspections when the defense presents documented facts: a named person, a dated report, an identified inconsistency, a stated connection between the records sought and the defense theory. Generalized suspicion loses under Stanaway, under Butler, and under Masi alike.
Preservation is the other half. These motions should be litigated before trial with a detailed offer of proof, a request for findings on each factor, and sealed records an appellate court can review. They can be renewed when discovery or newly obtained records change the factual foundation. On appeal, evidentiary rulings are reviewed for an abuse of discretion and underlying legal questions de novo, and whether a defendant was denied the constitutional right to present a defense is itself reviewed de novo. An unpreserved claim drops to plain-error review, a much harder road.
Frequently Asked Questions
Can the defense argue that someone else committed the assault?
Yes, when the evidence genuinely connects the other person to the offense. Under Holmes v. South Carolina, a court cannot exclude third-party evidence merely because the prosecution’s case appears strong, but it can exclude speculation lacking a concrete link.
Can the defense get the complainant’s counseling or CPS records?
Not on request. Under People v. Stanaway and MCR 6.201(C)(2), the defense must point to articulable facts creating a reasonable probability the records contain material information necessary to the defense. The judge then inspects them privately and releases only those that qualify.
The complainant accused someone else before. Does the jury hear about it?
It depends on the theory. If the defense offers credible evidence the prior accusation was false, People v. Butler requires an in camera hearing before the court rules. If the prior accusation was true and involves abuse that could explain a child’s sexual knowledge, People v. Masi supplies a five-factor test. Neither path is automatic.
Facing CSC Charges in Michigan
Butler, Masi, and Leonard were all decided within the last three years, and each turned on work done long before a jury was selected: the offer of proof, the record request, the motion filed on time and renewed when the facts developed. Grabel & Associates defends criminal sexual conduct charges in every county in Michigan and builds these evidentiary motions into the defense from the first day of a case. If you or someone you love is under investigation or has been charged, early preparation is what keeps these doors open.
Free Emergency Consultation 24/7: 1-800-342-7896.
This article is legal information, not legal advice. Every case is different, and reading this post does not create an attorney-client relationship. Talk to a lawyer about the facts of your own case.